Abstract: This study uses state tax amnesties to examine how firms respond to forgivenessparticularly repeated forgiveness-by a taxing authority. We posit that tax forgiveness programs alter taxpayer perceptions of the probability of detection by enforcers or the probability of future forgiveness programs, either of which could affect future tax aggressiveness. We find that firms headquartered in an amnesty-granting state increase state income tax aggressiveness following the first instance of tax amnesty, relative to control firms in other states. Moreover, we find evidence that tax aggressiveness incrementally increases with each additional repetition of a tax amnesty. Finally, we find that the effect of amnesties on tax aggressiveness is more prominent for small firms, which face less tax authority scrutiny and for which the tax aggressiveness measures are less confounded. Our findings suggest that repeated programs of tax forgiveness have increasingly negative implications for corporate tax collections.
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Introduction
Corporate taxpayers have clear incentives to legally minimize their tax liabilities to the extent that doing so maximizes after-tax returns (Scholes et al. 2014; Slemrod 2004 ).
Conversely, tax authorities have a clear mandate to ensure that taxpayers meet their tax obligations and enforce tax rules in place to achieve that mandate. These conflicting incentives create an inherent tension between taxpayers and tax authorities wherein both parties use various tactics to achieve their aims. On the one side, corporations reduce taxes by use of tax shelters, offshore income shifting, and a variety of other tax reduction mechanisms. Tax authorities, on the other side, will often undertake measures to increase tax revenues by increasing detection efforts or enforcement of tax statutes.
1 One particular tactic used by tax authorities is to offer a temporary grace period during which taxpayers can remit unpaid or overdue taxes for a reduced penalty or no penalty at all, which we generically label "tax forgiveness." 2 Tax forgiveness programs are often billed as a one-time chance for a fresh start-the last opportunity for the taxpayer to clear the slate. However, many jurisdictions have offered tax forgiveness multiple times, undercutting their claim that it is truly a one-time chance.
The objective of this study is to learn how firms respond to tax forgiveness programs offered by state tax authorities, especially when those programs are repeated. Specifically, we examine changes in corporate state effective tax rates by firms that are headquartered in states that grant the amnesty programs. Because the purpose of many state tax amnesty programs is to enroll and collect overdue taxes from new, unknown, noncompliant taxpayers, prior research has 1 We consider tax authorities to be the joint team of those responsible for creating tax law (e.g., legislative bodies) and those responsible for enforcing tax laws (e.g., revenue agencies or other tax collection agencies). 2 Recent uses of this tactic have occurred at the individual taxpayer level (e.g., forgiveness programs offered to individual taxpayers accused of using Swiss bank accounts to avoid U.S. taxes) and at the corporate taxpayer level (e.g., various state tax amnesty programs).
focused on the effect of these "nexus" amnesties on new enrollees (e.g., Fisher, Goddeeris, and Young 1989; Christian, Gupta, and Young 2002) or aggregate tax revenues (e.g., Alm and Beck 1993; Luitel and Sobel 2007) . In contrast, by focusing on firms headquartered in the amnestygranting state, we examine the effect of tax forgiveness on existing, known taxpayers. We hypothesize that offering to forgive noncompliant taxpayers can affect existing taxpayers' future effective tax rates for two related reasons. First, such forgiveness programs may reduce expectations of the tax authority detecting aggressive tax positions, because the very need for such a program may reveal a shortfall in the existing tax detection processes. That is, taxpayers might view the forgiveness program as a signal of weak tax enforcement, as suggested in Baer and LaBorgne (2008) . If the expected probability of detection decreases, the rational taxpayer will likely become less compliant (Allingham and Sandmo 1972) . Second, the first instance of tax forgiveness plausibly increases the taxpayer's expectation of another future tax forgiveness program. That is, an expectation of a future amnesty reduces the expected interest and penalty on any admitted underpayment, again reducing the expected cost of aggressive tax planning. Based on these arguments, we predict that tax forgiveness programs, especially repeated programs, will lead to increased corporate tax aggressiveness-our primary objective in this paper is to test these predictions.
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As an empirical setting, we employ income tax amnesty programs offered by U.S. states over the past four decades. Although each state amnesty program has unique attributes, there are 3 three common features associated with state-level corporate income tax amnesties that make them suitable for empirically testing our research question. First, the amnesties occur in different states at different times, which aids in the empirical identification of a tax response by corporations. Second, amnesties are often coupled with threats of increased enforcement and increased penalties post-amnesty, which could decrease future tax aggressiveness (Mikesell and Ross 2012) , providing tension to our main predictions. 4 Third, many states have offered multiple instances of tax amnesty, which allows us to assess the effects of repeated tax forgiveness. During our sample period, 39 states offered a corporate income tax amnesty program at least once; of these 39 states, 30 states have repeated a similar program at least once and several states have offered up to five different amnesties.
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An important feature of our empirical analyses is that we examine both large and small publicly-traded corporations (hereafter "firms"). These firms are important economic actors in the economy-they have both the incentives to compete on tax strategies and the legal expertise to effectively implement tax avoiding strategies. How they react to state tax amnesties is an important research question that has not been previously studied. 6 We employ the firm's state effective tax rate (STATE ETR) as a measure of the firm's tax burden-lower values of STATE ETR are associated with higher tax aggressiveness. We use a difference-in-differences research design, in which amnesty firms are matched to non-amnesty firms in a control sample to mitigate 4 the influence of unobserved, contemporaneous effects. 7 Thus, we test whether firms headquartered in amnesty-granting states exhibit greater increases in tax aggressiveness following the initial and subsequent amnesties than firms headquartered in non-amnesty-granting states during the same time period. The empirical model also includes firm-level controls, such as the firm's federal effective tax rate, sales revenues, R&D expense, leverage, and capital intensity to account for firm-level drivers of legal tax avoidance. Finally, the empirical model includes time-varying state statutory tax rates to account for subsequent changes in the state tax regime, a measure of the headquarter state's business friendliness index to account for the incentives and opportunities firms have to engage in non-aggressive tax avoidance, and headquarter-state fixed effects to account for state heterogeneity (e.g., red state versus blue state).
Overall, the evidence is consistent with firms headquartered in amnesty states increasing their tax aggressiveness following an amnesty. The average drop in STATE ETR following an initial amnesty is in the range of 0.44 to 0.99 percentage points, which is an 8 to 18 percent decrease from the average STATE ETR for amnesty firms. These results are robust to the inclusion of important additional control variables and fixed effects, as well as to several alternate research design choices (such as alternative control groups and matching criteria).
In addition, we find evidence consistent with higher levels of tax amnesty repetition (i.e., when a state offers its second, third, fourth or fifth amnesty) being positively associated with levels of state tax aggressiveness. Whereas the first amnesty is associated with an average drop in STATE ETR of 0.64 percentage points in this test, the second amnesty is associated with a drop of 0.69 percentage points and the third (and subsequent) amnesties are associated with a 5 drop of 1.25 percentage points. Overall, our findings lead us to conclude that tax forgiveness events are associated with increased tax aggressiveness, and that tax aggressiveness is increasing in the number of forgiveness repetitions.
To understand the economic magnitude of these effects, we compare them to the actual revenues recovered for the average amnesty, which Mikesell and Ross (2012) each of these concerns, we employ multiple robustness tests. 9 However, we cannot rule these concern out entirely, and thus we encourage readers to interpret all results within the scope of these limitations.
This study demonstrates potential firm-level consequences faced by offering tax forgiveness programs, which would be useful for state tax policy makers interested in understanding the consequences of policy choices. Although the economics literature has examined the effects of amnesties on aggregate tax revenues and individual taxpayer compliance (i.e., from the perspective of the government or the individual taxpayer), to our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the effects of tax forgiveness programs on tax aggressiveness from the perspective of the firm.
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Examining firms is important because, relative to most individual taxpayers, they are more capable of employing strategic tax planning, more geographically disperse, and more sensitive to competitive pressures. 10 There are many state tax planning strategies that firms could take during the sample period, including the Delaware holding company (Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock 2013) , captive real estate investment trusts (see the Walmart example reported by Drucker 2007) , profit sharing with special purpose entities (Demere, Donohoe and Lisowsky 2015) , internal debt allocation, and abusive use of management companies (Barnwell 2009 ).
Thus, public firms who use these schemes differ from the typical taxpayer affected by tax amnesties, as the typical taxpayer is an unknown individual, unregistered small business or larger corporations that "come into the fold" for the first time. This distinction also separates our research from prior research on tax amnesties which primarily focuses on the fiscal implications of amnesties for states or compliance implications for individuals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops hypotheses; Section 3 discusses the data and empirical design; Section 4 presents the primary empirical results; Section 5 presents alternate and robustness tests; and Section 6 concludes.
Background and Hypotheses Development
Background
Tax amnesties have received broad usage across countries and states. Tax amnesty programs are generally conducted by states in order to achieve two objectives (Baer and Le Borgne 2008 Finally, the report indicates that the explicit costs of administering the amnesty program, about $12.6 million, were a small fraction of the gross revenues of over $250 million across all tax types. However, there may be hidden costs of these programs that are more difficult to ascertain.
For example, Baer and Le Borgne (2008) point out that an amnesty's success should be compared against the "eventual reduction in taxpayer compliance resulting from the loss of credibility of the tax administration…" (p. 2). In the next section, we consider the economic implications of the amnesty for other taxpayers in the jurisdiction, whose reaction to the program could lead to decreased effective tax rates (i.e., increased tax aggressiveness).
Tax aggressiveness for the first instance of tax forgiveness
Explicit tax reduction ranges from the unquestionably legal (e.g., investing in municipal bonds) to fraudulent (e.g., tax evasion). The economics of more aggressive forms of tax avoidance are rooted in Becker's (1968) seminal model of the economics of crime. Drawing upon that theory, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model tax non-compliance as a risky economic decision, in which an individual taxpayer chooses the level of taxable income to report to tax authorities in the face of risky tax penalties if caught underreporting that income. These theories have motivated a large body of subsequent research on tax compliance in which the taxpayer is an amoral, rational decision-maker who decides whether or not to underreport income (and therefore cheat on taxes) based on the maximum utility derived from retaining the unpaid tax dollars after factoring in the likelihood of getting caught and the associated penalties (see Slemrod 2004 for a review).
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When applied to the setting of a tax forgiveness event, the intuition of the traditional costbenefit model of tax compliance suggests that taxpayers will become more tax aggressive to the extent that tax forgiveness programs are perceived to indicate a decline in the likelihood of getting caught. For instance, tax forgiveness events can themselves be an indication of poor enforcement as they reveal the fact that a non-trivial number of taxpayers have been noncompliant. Moreover, amnesties are often driven by political and economic incentives to raise revenues quickly. However, the tax administrator is not necessarily part of the decision process, but ends up bearing the compliance and enforcement burden of the amnesty with the same level of resources, which can in turn lower their detection capacity. These arguments are arguably more salient for repeated tax forgiveness programs, which can have two additional effects on future tax aggressiveness: first, by changing taxpayers' perceptions of the credibility of tax authorities' claims and second, by altering taxpayers' expectations for future tax forgiveness events (Baer and Le Borgne 2008) . Indeed, our discussions with tax administrators associated with state tax amnesties reveal that a tax amnesty "changed the dialogue" as taxpayers repeatedly sought and lobbied for additional amnesty.
H1:
There is an increase in corporate tax aggressiveness following a tax forgiveness event.
On the other hand, to the extent that tax forgiveness events give the perception of increased tax enforcement, the rational taxpayer facing an economic cost/benefit decision regarding tax compliance could decrease their level of tax aggressiveness (Alm and Beck 1991) .
From a practical perspective, to the extent that firms reveal or become more transparent in their current tax strategies as a result of the tax amnesty, this can lead to decreased tax aggressiveness because their options for tax planning techniques have been diminished. Tax forgiveness events can give the perception of increased enforcement because they are often bundled with increased future enforcement and/or penalties, such as increased fines and penalties, stricter enforcement, new enforcement technology, increased jail time and major tax reforms (Mikesell and Ross 2012) . Mikesell (1986) and Alm and Beck (1991) note that these accompanying programs could potentially make tax non-compliance much more costly. Alm et al. (1990) use a controlled experiment to disentangle these two effects (in an individual rather than corporate tax setting) and find that the average level of individual taxpayer compliance declines (that is, tax aggressiveness increases) after an authority offers tax forgiveness, and increases after an authority increases enforcement efforts. Moreover, they find that when a forgiveness event is accompanied by increased enforcement, compliance increases by more than an identical increase in enforcement alone. Other studies, however, have produced mixed evidence with regards to the implication that forgiveness bundled with increased enforcement can significantly boost compliance (e.g., Mikesell 1986; Alm and Beck 1993).
Tax Aggressiveness for Repeated Instances of Tax Forgiveness
We distinguish our study from prior research in two ways-we examine the effects of tax forgiveness programs (1) from the perspective of the firm (2) when tax forgiveness events are repeated. In our judgment, no paper has examined these two things in tandem. Much of the prior research has focused primarily on individual taxpayers; however, we expect that firms will react differently than individuals to tax forgiveness events. Firms operate in a competitive environment and are generally more sophisticated than individuals and therefore more able to employ strategic tax planning to reduce taxes paid. Moreover, while the average individual taxpayer is likely risk averse in tax planning, firms will be relatively more risk neutral in tax planning because firms compensate managers with equity incentives to offset individual risk aversion (Rego and Wilson 2012) .
On the other hand, firms are also subject to reputational concerns that may inhibit their willingness to aggressively tax plan. Moreover, many firms operate in multiple jurisdictions, which may reduce their responses to a single jurisdiction's tax amnesty.
In addition, the typical study examines the revenue and compliance effect of state tax forgiveness programs without distinguishing between single and repeated amnesties (e.g., Mikesell and Ross 2012) . This comment is not meant to disparage these studies, because understanding the revenue and policy implications of a given amnesty for individual taxpayers is very important. Instead, we highlight this to point out that different taxpayers and different iterations of amnesties may actually yield different responses and have different implications.
Although the literature is replete with studies of single tax forgiveness events, very little empirical research has used archival data to examine the effects of repeated tax forgiveness. An exception is Luitel and Sobel (2007) , who use a panel of state quarterly tax revenue data to show that repeated tax forgiveness leads to less revenue collection in the actual amnesty period and magnifies revenue losses in the long-run. As noted in Mikesell and Ross (2012) , an issue with Luitel and Sobel (2007) is that it is unclear whether repeated amnesties are the result or the cause of lower tax revenues. This issue highlights a weakness of using broad state level measures and 13 simple cross-sectional tests, as opposed to examining the question at the firm level using staggered amnesties in a difference-in-difference design, which allows for a more clear identification of an amnesty effect.
When a tax forgiveness event is repeated, we posit there are three potential effects on a firm's level of future tax aggressiveness that are unique relative to the effects of a single forgiveness event. First, the tax authority can lose credibility in the eyes of taxpayers because they are again repeating a program that are often alleged to be "one-time only." Second, and relatedly, the perceived likelihood of the taxing authority subsequently offering additional amnesties can also increase. Third, in a competitive economy, firms that were not avoiding taxes may feel they are at an increasing competitive disadvantage to tax avoiding firms as the number of forgiveness events increases, which in turn can affect their level of tax aggressiveness.
While repeated amnesties could include provisions that increase enforcement resources or penalties for overly aggressive tax positions, these enforcement effects are likely to be tempered by the loss of credibility of the tax authority, changes in perceived competitiveness, and the perceived probability of future forgiveness. Accordingly, we posit the following directional hypothesis:
H2: Firms respond to repeated state tax forgiveness events with increasing levels of tax aggressiveness.
We now describe the sample and research design implemented to test these hypotheses.
Sample, descriptive statistics, and empirical design
Sample
Our objective is to assess firms' changes in tax aggressiveness subsequent to income tax forgiveness. We begin with a comprehensive list of state tax amnesties maintained by the other firm attributes. By including these tax avoidance variables in the empirical estimation, the remaining variation in state effective tax rates is more likely to be driven by tax aggressiveness.
As summarized in Table 2 , we impose the following data requirements for a firm-year observation to be included in our sample. First, we remove financial firm-years from the sample, 
Descriptive statistics
We present summary descriptive statistics in Table 3 , Panel A for both amnesty firm and matched control firm observations. The median STATE ETR in the amnesty observations is 4.7%, while that for the control observations is 3.4%, and the difference in medians is statistically significant. 19 That difference, however, is likely driven in part by the large difference between the statutory tax rates of amnesty versus non-amnesty states; many of the non-amnesty states do not collect income taxes from firms, and thus control firms (while still paying state income taxes in other states in which they have operations) have a median 18 By allowing a single control firm to serve as a match for multiple treatment firms, we may be susceptible to undue influence by the repeated control firms. However, by allowing the firms in the control group to serve as matches for multiple treatment firms, we greatly increase the number of usable observations in our sample. We also note that our fixed effects estimation described below should alleviate the effects of industries or states that have a disproportionate number of observations in the control group. We cluster standard errors by firm to reflect the multiple occurrences of the same control firms. 19 In Panel A of states, the figure shows that the statutory tax rate and average STATE ETR move in tandem throughout the sample period. The figure also shows that average state statutory tax rates for amnesty states stayed quite stable throughout the sample period, suggesting that the effect is not driven by changes in legal tax rates. Overall, the figure provides visual evidence that firms in amnesty states appear to exhibit a relative decline in their STATE ETR, while these firms face a relatively flat statutory tax rate over the sample period.
Empirical design
20 There are several concerns related to the difference in STATE ETR between the treatment and control samples. First, there is the concern that treatment firms face higher statutory state rates and therefore have much more incentive for tax aggressiveness. Second, and relatedly, treatment firms also have much "room" for tax aggressiveness, in that their opportunities for tax aggressiveness are likely greater. We attempt to account for these concerns with a difference-in-differences research design, which accounts for temporal changes in STATE ETR, and with state-level controls (including the state statutory tax rate and headquarter-state fixed effects) and the firm's FEDERAL ETR, which account for the firm's tax aggressiveness incentives and activity.
We use two variations of a difference-in-differences design to test our hypotheses. The first variation is specified as follows:
In equation (1) The coefficient, α3, in equation (1) addresses our first hypothesis (H1). α3 < 0 suggests that STATE ETRs decrease in the treatment group following an amnesty program, consistent with 21 Note that a given firm's headquarters can change over time, but Compustat's identification of headquarter state is static because it is based on the most recent location. We consider the effect of this measurement error in the Online Appendix. 22 For a given firm in the treatment group, POST FIRST AMNESTY is set equal to one for all years after the firm's headquarter state grants their initial amnesty program. For a given firm in the control group, POST FIRST AMNESTY is artificially set to one when the corresponding matched firm in the treatment group is also set to one. 23 The headquarter-state statutory tax rates account for over-time variation in the state's statutory tax rate for corporations. However, one shortcoming of statutory tax rates is that they do not account for changes in tax base or in tax credits. BUSINESS FRIENDLINESS rankings are largely a function of tax incentives and should help control for changes to the tax base. Also, because of limited data in the early part of our sample, we omit control variables that proxy for several determinants of tax avoidance studied in prior literature (e.g., incentive compensation (Rego and Wilson 2012) , managerial style (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew 2010), etc.) . To the extent that these omitted and unavailable control variables are not systematically correlated with states' amnesty schedules, our results should be unbiased. 24 When the model includes state fixed effects, we drop AMNESTY STATE from the estimation because it does not vary over time and is therefore perfectly collinear with the state fixed effects.
the notion that, on average, firms are more tax aggressive after the first instance of tax forgiveness.
To test our second hypothesis of how firms respond to repeated forgiveness, we extend equation (1) by including an additional indicator variable (POST REPEAT AMNESTY) for repeated amnesties as follows:
In the treatment group, POST REPEAT AMNESTY is an indicator variable set equal to one for all firm-years after the state in which the firm is headquartered grants a second amnesty (including firm-years after any more additional amnesties). In the control group, observations take on the value for POST REPEAT AMNESTY shared by their matched observation in the treatment group.
The Online Appendix illustrates the way the timing variables are operationalized, and includes both an example and a timeline of each of the timing measures. H2 predicts α5 < 0, i.e., that firms are more tax aggressive when they operate in a tax environment that repeatedly forgives taxpayers.
We also provide an alternative design for testing H2 in which the constructs of forgiveness and repeated forgiveness are operationalized through indicators grouped by the n th amnesty. N1 is an indicator variable set equal to one for the group of firm-year observations that are headquartered in states that have previously offered one (and only one) corporate income tax amnesty at the time of the observation. N2 is similarly equal to one for the groups of firm-year observations that are headquartered in states that have previously offered two (and only two) corporate income tax amnesties at the time of observation. N3+ is set equal to one for all firmyear observations that have previously been offered at least three amnesties by the state in which the firm has its headquarters. The estimation includes these indicators as follows: 
In estimating equation (3), we employ the same set of control variables, fixed effects, clustering and winsorization techniques as in equation (2).
H2 predicts that α6 and α7 are negative and that 0 > α5 > α6 > α7. This pattern in the coefficients would suggest that relative to firms in the control group, firms that are offered the chance to participate in multiple tax forgiveness events are progressively more tax aggressive.
In summary, the empirical models are designed to account for factors that influence both tax aggressiveness by firms and the incidence of tax amnesties by states. The difference-indifferences research design includes a main effect for amnesty states that captures the primary differences for that state. The models also include year fixed effects to account for economic booms and busts, pro-cyclicality and general trends in amnesties; state fixed effects to account for time-invariant political factors (red vs. blue state) and regional effects; and time-varying measures of the statutory tax rate and the state's business friendliness to account for changes in the tax climate. Moreover, the amnesties are staggered across both states and time, which should account for elements unique to a particular state or time period. These design choices are intended to minimize concerns about unobserved or unmeasured variation in tax aggressiveness or the non-random nature of tax amnesties; we consider many robustness tests in Section 5 and the Online Appendix, where we also detail the study's empirical limitations.
Empirical results
Regression results on primary tests
Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 show the results of estimating equation (1) as a test of our first hypothesis-that an initial tax amnesty is associated with an increase in tax aggressiveness. Table 4 show the results of estimating equation (2), which tests H2.
Models 3 and 4 of
We find a negative and significant coefficient on AMNESTY STATE *POST REPEAT AMNESTY. Specifically, when we include state fixed effects, we find that α5 is -0.0026, which is significant at the ten percent level. The estimated coefficient on α3 (AMNESTY STATE *POST FIRST AMNESTY) remains statistically negative with a value of -0.0064, which is consistent with our evidence on H1 from equation (1 significantly below zero at the one percent level (one-tailed). We also observe that the coefficient on each iterative amnesty variable is more negative than the previous one-i.e., the coefficients follow the pattern: α5 > α6 > α7-which is consistent with firms increasing tax aggressiveness with each additional amnesty. From a statistical perspective, we see that the difference between the first and second amnesty is insignificant (i.e., a test of α5 = α6 yields an Fstat of 0.17, with a p-value of 0.67) and the difference between the second and third amnesty is statistically significant (i.e., a test of α6 = α7 yields an F-stat of 6.33, with a p-value of 0.01, onetailed).
In order to examine the economic magnitude of these estimates, we calculate the average decrease in state tax collections as follows: the coefficient estimates of AMNESTY STATE*N1, AMNESTY STATE*N2, and AMNESTY STATE*N3+ presented in Column 1 of Table 6 , Panel B are multiplied by total pretax domestic income $119 billion, $40 billion, and $51 billion respectively, which represent the aggregate total pretax domestic income of small firms (i.e., firms with total assets less than the sample median by year) that have headquarters in amnesty states across all years where the state authority has previously offered one, two, or three or more amnesties, respectively. The sum of these three products suggests a total decrease in small firm tax collections across all amnesties in the sample of approximately $2.7 billion. There are 99 amnesties in our sample, which suggests that the average amnesty is associated with an approximate $28 million multi-year decrease in future tax collections. This quantification of economic magnitude is subject to several assumptions. To the extent that any of the intermediate assumptions in this calculation are inaccurate, the final estimate will also be affected.
In summary, our results of tests of H1 show that STATE ETRs are lower following the first amnesty. Moreover, the results are consistent with H2, in that STATE ETRs become progressively lower with each additional amnesty offered by a state. Overall, the results are consistent with tax forgiveness programs being positively associated with tax aggressiveness, and that association becomes more positive with repetitions of forgiveness.
Robustness tests
Small Firms and STATE ETRs
Prior research has shown that large firms are audited much more regularly by federal tax authorities (e.g., Hoopes, Mescall and Pittman 2012) . In fact, the largest firms are constantly under federal audit under the IRS's Coordinated Industry Case program (Ayers, Seidman and Towery 2015) . The same also likely holds for state tax authorities, who are likely well aware of the largest and most prominent corporate taxpayers in the state. Because these firms are constantly scrutinized, they are less likely to respond to tax amnesties with increased tax aggressiveness. Based on this economic rationale, we predict that an amnesty effect will be more prominent for smaller firms than for larger firms.
To test this notion, we replicate the tests in Tables 4 and 5 , but partition the sample into two groups: small firms and large firms. Specifically, we define small firms (large firms) as those firm-years that fall below (above) the yearly sample median of total assets. We then estimate equation (2) for each partition of the sample using the fixed-effects specification presented in in Table 4 , Model 4. The results of this test are presented in Table 6 , Panel A. The results show strong evidence that the negative association between amnesties and STATE ETRs is much more pronounced for small firms. In particular, the coefficients on AMNESTY STATE*POST FIRST AMNESTY and AMNESTY STATE*POST REPEAT AMNESTY are both negative and significant for the group of small firms, whereas neither of these coefficients is significant in the group of large firms. Moreover, in cross-equation tests (for which we use seemingly unrelated estimation), the coefficients for small firms are statistically greater than those for large firms.
In Panel B of Table 6 , we present the results of estimation equation (3) for each of the size-based partitions of the sample, using the fixed-effects specification, as in Table 5 , Model 3.
Here again, we find consistent evidence that the amnesty effect on tax aggressiveness appears to be concentrated in small firms. The coefficients on the interaction terms (α5, α6 and α7) are negative and significant for the group of small firms, but are insignificant (at the five percent level) for the large firms. In cross-equation tests of coefficient equality, we find that the primary coefficients are much more negative, in both statistical and economic terms, for the group of small firms than they are for the group of large firms. Finally, we find more clear evidence of the pattern that increased repetitions of amnesties are associated with increased tax aggressiveness for the group of small firms-this pattern is not present in the group of large firms. Overall, the cross-sectional tests for different size firms provide more evidence to suggest that amnesties are associated with increased tax aggressiveness, especially for small firms.
These small-firm tests provide another empirical benefit related to the measurement of tax aggressiveness with STATE ETR. The STATE ETR is actually a blended rate of the state tax expense for the firm across all state and sub-national jurisdictions where the firm has operations, which gives rise to several concerns with the measurement of STATE ETR for our study. First, the effect of a given amnesty, which occurs in a single state, will be muted for firms with operations in many states. Second, to the extent that an amnesty occurs in a non-headquarters state, but has an effect on the firm's tax aggressiveness, our test will not be able to detect such an effect. Finally, as noted above, changes in state taxation that are unrelated to amnesties (such as changes in apportionment, combined versus unitary reporting, investment tax credits, R&D credits, etc.) will also affect the STATE ETR.
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By partitioning the sample into small and large firms, we are isolating the set of firms (i.e., the small firms) for whom this problem is a lesser concern. The economic intuition is that the more concentrated a firm's activity is within its headquarter state, the more likely that the STATE ETR is representative of the firm's overall state tax burden in its headquarter state. In untabulated descriptive statistics, we find that these small firms operate in less than half the states as the large firms and have just one fourth the number of subsidiaries that large firms have.
Thus, for small firms, the STATE ETR is more likely to represent the tax burden in the state where the firm is headquartered. The fact that the results reported in Table 6 are so much stronger for small firms bears this point out-the results are strongest both where firms face less scrutiny and where measurement error in STATE ETR is less of an issue.
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Short-window Event Study Around Amnesties
25 While we cannot control for every change in a state tax regime that can affect the tax base (e.g., apportionment, unitary filing, throwback rules, etc.), it is unlikely that any single correlated omitted factor is driving our results because of the repeated nature of the amnesties and the non-repeated nature of the regime changes. In other words, a state can offer amnesty multiple times, but a state can only switch to unitary filing once. Because we see incremental results from each amnesty, it is unlikely that an omitted characteristic of the state tax system is driving our results. 26 In addition to the small versus large firm tests, we attempt to overcome this issue with three untabulated tests based on three different sample partitions to approximate the concentration of the firm's operations using location information as reported in the firm's 10-K, as in Dyreng et al. (2013) . The three partitions are: firms with high vs low proportion of subsidiaries in the headquarter state; firms with high versus low total number of subsidiaries; firm with high versus low number of states where they operate. We expect that a tax forgiveness program in a particular state will be more salient for firms that have highly concentrated operations in the headquarter state. We find that most of our results continue to persist, though with lower statistical significance, in the "high concentration" subsamples while the results do not persist in the "low concentration" subsamples. These results are untabulated (but available upon request) because these data are only available after 1995 and only for a subset of firms, which removes a substantial portion of the primary sample (i.e., our sample size decreases by more than 70%).
In the primary analyses, we examine firms' responses to amnesty programs in all periods following the amnesty. An issue with this research design choice, however, is that substantial time can pass following an amnesty, which could diminish its impact on the firm's choice to increase tax aggressiveness. For example, California had only one amnesty and it occurred in the mid-1980s. It is quite unlikely that that particular amnesty program continues to have an effect on firm's tax decisions 10 or 20 years later. To address this concern, we re-estimate our primary analyses using a short-window event study design, in which the STATE ETRs of amnesty firms are compared to those for non-amnesty firms in a five-year window around the amnesty event (+/-two years prior around the amnesty year). We choose this window somewhat arbitrarily, assuming the two-year "pre" period will serve as a baseline for the subsequent twoyear "post" period. This allows us to view the relative change in STATE ETRs in the short period before and after the amnesty.
The results of this alternative test are presented in Table 7 , with a separate column for each iteration of amnesty (Model 1 for the window around a first amnesty, and so on). Panel A reports results for the full sample, while Panel B reports the results for the subsample of small firms. Overall, we find evidence consistent with H1 using a short-window research design for both the full sample and the subsample of small firms. Specifically, in Model 1, the coefficient on POST*AMNESTY STATE is negative (-0.0025) and significant at the five percent level (onetailed).
In this design, we find that the evidence is weaker for H2. For example, in Model 3, which examines the response to the third amnesty, the coefficient is negative, but only marginally significant (p < 0.10, one-tailed), while the coefficient for the second amnesty is not significantly different from zero. Panel B shows fairly similar results, with statistical 27 significance slightly improving for the small firms in this subsample. A limitation of this type of short-window analysis, however, is that tax planning often takes years to implement and adjustment costs are substantial-hence, a short-window test misses what a longer-window analysis, such as that in Table 3 , might capture.
Additional Robustness Tests
In the Online Appendix, we describe and tabulate additional robustness tests that help rule out some specific concerns that could potentially influence the inferences of this study, including that: firms can move headquarters during the sample period (Heider and Ljungqvist 2015 and Engelberg, Ozoguz and Wang 2013) ; the nature of the firm is changing over time (Fama and French 2001) ; trends in tax avoidance are changing over time, (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock 2016) ; STATE ETR must be interpreted differently following FIN 48 (Gupta, Mills, and Towery 2014) , etc.); control observations are drawn from a small subset of states and are matched "with replacement"; state laws are systematically different in the latter part of the sample period; and finally, that control observations often come from states with no income tax for corporations. Our results are generally robust in tests designed to address these concerns.
Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of tax forgiveness and repeated tax forgiveness on corporate tax aggressiveness. We hypothesize that a single tax forgiveness event will be associated with an increase in the level of corporate tax aggressiveness. Tax forgiveness can increase tax aggressiveness to the extent that it changes rational taxpayers' assessment of the likelihood of getting caught in non-tax compliance or that it changes taxpayers' expectation for future amnesties. To the extent, however, that the program contains an element of increased enforcement, which Mikesell and Ross (2012) note is common place with tax amnesties or to the extent that taxpayers are unaware of the tax forgiveness programs, corporate tax aggressiveness could remain unchanged. Across multiple tests, we find evidence of increased tax aggressiveness. Given that finding, we predict that greater repititions of tax forgiveness will be associated with increasing levels of corporate tax aggressiveness. Our results also bear out this prediction. We believe our study has implications for policy, in that it shows evidence of a cost to tax amnesty programs.
To a degree, our results also speak to the potential effects of an additional tax repatriation Although tax amnesties and tax holidays differ along several important dimensions, at a simplified level, they are similar in that both offer an element of tax forgiveness. To the extent that firms anticipate that another forgiveness event may occur, they could become more tax aggressive and recognize more income overseas to reduce U.S. taxes. Indeed, articles in the business press report that U.S. firms are heavily lobbying for a tax holiday (Rubin and Drucker 2011) and make the conjecture that firms are sitting on cash "awaiting a repatriation tax holiday" (Fleischer 2012) . Our evidence, albeit in a very different setting, is consistent with such a potential response by U.S. firms to another tax holiday.
27
27 However, we emphasize the existence of several clear differences between a tax holiday and a tax amnesty, such as possible differences in taxpayers' level of presumed tax avoidance, differences in financial reporting incentives, and differences in the tax complexity between state and international taxation. Hence, we acknowledge substantial differences in the tax holiday and tax amnesty settings and urge caution in over-interpreting our results in the international setting. Table 1 Amnesty Selection
Appendix 1 Definition and source of variables
This table presents the sample selection of amnesties by reconciling our sample of amnesties that cover corporate income taxes with the Mikesell and Ross (2012) sample of amnesties that cover all tax types.
Number of amnesties from Mikesell & Ross (2012) 117
Less: all amnesties in states with no income tax Nevada (2002 Nevada ( , 2008 Nevada ( , 2010 (2002, 2006, 2012) -3 Texas Franchise & Gross Receipts Tax (1984 , 2004 -3 Washington Business & Occupation Tax (2011) -1 -11 Less: amnesties in non-state jurisdictions District of Columbia (1987 Columbia ( , 1995 Columbia ( , 2010 -3 -3
Number of amnesties in sample 99 Table 2 Sample Selection
This table details the criteria applied to select the firm-year observations for our sample. We begin our sample period three years before the first amnesty.
Initial sample of U.S. firm-year observations (1978 -2012 (2) and (3) for partitions of the sample based on firm size. Specifically, in Panel A (Panel B), we present the results of a replication of the model in Table 4 , Model 4 (Table 5 , Model 3), estimated separately for small firms and large firms. Small firms (large firms) are defined as those firmyears that fall below (above) the annual sample median of annual total assets. The models include all controls, as well as industry and state fixed effects as in the previously estimated models. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample period covers the years 1978 to 2011. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively, using one-tailed p-values where we make a directional prediction and two-tailed p-values otherwise. Because all models include full fixed effects, AMNESTY STATE is omitted because it is perfectly collinear with the headquarter-state fixed effects. For cross-equation tests of coefficient equality, we employ seemingly unrelated estimation and report the corresponding Wald χ 2 statistics and p-values. This table presents the results of an event study using a five year window around the amnesty programs. For firms that have headquarters in a state that grants an amnesty in the sample period, we include two years of data prior to the amnesty program as a baseline pre-event period. We also include data from the year of the amnesty and the two following years as a POST period. Each observation from a firm headquartered in an amnesty granting state (AMNESTY STATE) is matched to an observation for a similar firm with headquarters in a state that did not grant an amnesty during the period. Model 1 is estimated using only observations from the window surrounding the first instance of an amnesty. Model 2 uses observations from the window surrounding a second instance of amnesty. Model 3 aggregates observations surrounding a third, fourth, or fifth instance of amnesty. Model 4 includes data from all occurrences. Panel A presents the results of these tests on the full sample of firms-years, as identified in Table 2 . Panel B presents the results of similar tests on a subsample of small firms, which are defined as those firmyears that fall below the annual sample median of annual total assets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively, using one-tailed p-values where we make a directional prediction and two-tailed p-values otherwise. . 
Panel A: Short Window Effect (All firms)
